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1. Introduction
Failures in the World Trade Organisation’s Doha Round 
have prompted countries to turn to preferential trade agree-
ments. Every country with a stake in world trade is now ne-
gotiating bilateral free trade agreements – with occasional 
infusions of regional attempts to forge greater trade ties by 
reducing barriers to trade and investments, e.g. the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP). Some claims Free Trade Agree-
ments to be second-best alternatives to a dysfunctional mul-
tilateral system; others see them through the eyes of Jacob 
Viner and consider them to be termites of the trading sys-
tem, diverting trade and causing bureaucratic obstacles to 
trade through Rules of Origin regulations.1 Yet regardless 
the side of the argument, the most outstanding feature of 
many FTAs is that they do not have impressive effects on 
growth in trade and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The 
EU, for instance, considers its FTA with South Korea to be 
a first-of-a-kind, “deep and comprehensive” bilateral agree-
ment with a medium-sized growth market – and at the time 
when it was ratified, EU representatives hailed it as an im-
portant trade agreement for the European post-crisis recov-
ery. The estimates of the European Commission, however, 
suggested this FTA to boost GDP in Europe by no more 
than 0.08 percent.2  
Yet some countries may now be about to enter a new era 
of preferential trade agreements – an era defined by larger 
preferential trade agreements with more sizeable effects on 
economic growth and that are premised on the ambition to 
usher global trade into the 21st Century by addressing other 
trade barriers than those covered by past WTO agreements. 
TPP is such an agreement – perhaps the most important 
trade negotiation that the United States is currently in-
volved in. Now that Japan has joined the Trans-Pacific Part-
nership negotiations, the value of a TPP deal have gone up 
significantly for all involved countries, including the U.S. 
1 Jagdish Bhagwati (2008) offers a robust view against preferen-
tial trade agreements. My colleague Razeen Sally is also a noted 
skeptic of many FTAs, especially Asian FTAs. See Sally (2006) 
and (2007). 
2 CEPII (2010).
The European Union has just launched trade negotiations 
with Japan. Even if there are serious doubts by some observ-
ers that this agreement will materialise, the potential ben-
efits are sizeable and exceed any other bilateral trade agree-
ment the EU has signed with a third country.  Yet more 
significantly, the EU and the United States have now started 
negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership (TTIP). If all these three initiatives would yield re-
sults, they will have a serious impact on trade and GDP. 
The transatlantic initiative is premised on the idea that it 
will extend the scope of a Free Trade Agreement beyond the 
traditional components of eliminating most tariffs and free 
up some restrictions on trade in services. The biggest com-
ponent of TTIP is agreements to reduce regulatory diver-
gence, most probably by new horizontal rules and sectoral 
agreements like Mutual Recognition Agreements. Further-
more, it will involve an investment component to substitute 
current Bilateral Investment Treaties and provide for new 
market access for investments. It will delve into other “un-
finished business” in trade policy, like openness in public 
procurement. And leaders of the both side claim the agree-
ment should serve as platform for cooperating on pertinent 
trade issues globally, such as state-owned enterprises.
However, TTIP and some of these ambitions are met with 
scepticism from some seasoned observers of trade policy.3 
Others, with less careful views, have also made contribu-
tions to the debate. Have the EU and the U.S. not tried this 
before – and without success – some have complained? Is 
this just not an attempt to create a “Fortress Atlantic” to de-
fend against competition from rising Asia, especially China? 
Another attacking point is that this initiative is quite typical 
for the Western-centric approach to international economic 
cooperation: just as other many countries are getting up to 
a position of economic power that could match the EU or 
the U.S., the old Western powers take their business out of 
multilateral organisations to settle affairs bilaterally.
3 See e.g. Barfield (2013) and Langhammer (2013).
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So, is the strange acronym of TTIP a code word for the 
death knell of the WTO and multilateral trade cooperation? 
Is this a trade agreement premised on defensive attitudes 
to world trade?
My answer to both questions is “No”. I think there are some 
problematic aspects associated with TTIP as well as with 
other large regional agreements that will need attention. 
It should also be acknowledged that neither TTIP nor TPP 
was born out of deep and genuine beliefs in the principles 
of free markets or the classical school of free trade. Like 
any other trade agreement in the past year, these initiatives 
build on conditional views of free trade and free competi-
tion, mixed up with soft mercantilism, a growing urgency 
for transatlantic trade leadership, and a pragmatic desire 
to support economic growth. There are supporters of TTIP 
that build their case on more defensive arguments, but to 
the extent it is possible to determine what sentiments that 
have guided leaders to launch TTIP, defensive motivations 
have not been one of them.
The conclusion of this paper is that countries outside the 
EU and the U.S., especially the larger emerging economies, 
should fear TTIP failure rather than TTIP success. A failed 
effort would not only imply less market openness but prob-
ably also less willingness on the part of the two giants of the 
world economy to exercise leadership for the world trading 
system. The alternative to TTIP is not renewed efforts to 
negotiate new multilateral agreements. It follows, there-
fore, that my view on TTIP is that it is neither an attempt 
at a transatlantic fortress nor an exclusive, old-club arrange-
ment that will undermine the World Trade Organisation. If 
it works well, TTIP is rather one of few feasible strategies 
to breathe new life into international trade cooperation and 
advance the agenda for freer trade elsewhere. It is a trade 
agreement that principally should be feared by those forces 
that wish to prevent or deter liberalising trade reforms.
2. Why TTIP?
The origin of TTIP, at least from the viewpoint of the Eu-
ropean Union, is indicative of current trends of European 
cooperation. Leading voices in the European Commission 
have for long been a sceptic of transatlantic trade agree-
ment. The Commission’s Trade Directorate nodded in this 
direction under the leadership of Leon Brittan – but most 
of the time the Commission’s view has been that a transat-
lantic Free Trade Agreement would erode the multilateral 
system and deny the EU from negotiation other, and better, 
trade agreements.
In Europe, TTIP was rather born out of initiatives taken by 
member states, especially Germany and Sweden, and the 
European Parliament.4  And they, along with other partici-
pants, managed to persuade a reluctant Commission that 
TTIP would make economic sense and that it would not 
have damaging consequences on the multilateral system. 
There is particularly one argument that has carried weight 
in Europe’s process to favour a transatlantic trade initiative: 
the European Union is in need of higher economic growth. 
Consequently, trade agreements that could deliver higher 
economic have been given a new hearing as the economic 
crisis in Europe has worsened. Few would deny that TTIP 
has the capacity to deliver a sizeable contribution to GDP 
in Europe. The gains form this FTA would be bigger than 
from other FTAs for the reason that it involves two large 
economies. Estimates from a study commissioned by the 
European Commission suggest the TTIP gain for the EU to 
be in the tune of 0.3-0.5 percent of GDP (the GDP gains are 
slightly smaller for the U.S.)5 Other estimates suggest the 
potential gains to be larger6  – and there has been a debate 
among some trade economists in Europe about the method-
ologies used in different studies.7  Yet the “official” estimate 
still suggest that TTIP will have a non-negligible impact on 
GDP in Europe: GDP will expand by approximately 120 bil-
lion euro, translating into a gain for the average four-person 
household of about 550 euro per year. It does not happen 
very often that the results of policy achievements by EU 
institutions are of that calibre. Consequently, even under 
the conservative assumptions used in the Commission-led 
study, TTIP will make a contribution to economic growth 
and jobs in the EU that is high enough to motivate the ef-
fort.
The economic case for TTIP is not the only argument used 
by leaders of the European Union, or the United States. But 
it is the most important one. Other sentiments may have 
some influence too, but only at the margin. Hillary Clin-
ton portrayed a transatlantic FTA as an “economic Nato”, 
but trade officials in the United States acknowledged al-
ready at an early stage in the consideration of TTIP that the 
agreement would be won or lost for its effects on jobs and 
growth. Even if other arguments have not carried the same 
political weight, it does not follow that they are less impor-
tant analytically.
3. The “sequential strategy”: offensive or defensive?
Arguably, one of the most interesting aspects of TTIP is its 
potential effect on global trade – or global efforts to negotiate 
new trade agreements. Is this effective positive or negative 
– or to put it differently: is it more or less likely to prompt 
new and international efforts to liberalise trade and improve 
trade rules against discriminatory government action? This 
chapter will present my view. It is divided in two parts. 
First I will address the question if TTIP is a defensive strat-
egy for the European Union – or to rephrase the question: 
is TTIP an attempt to avoid new competition from rising 
economic powers? The answer to this question does not only 
have to rely on individual judgment: facts and analytical cir-
cumstances also play a role. The answer to the second ques-
tion is much more based on judgement – and that question 
is: will TTIP help or hurt efforts to negotiate new interna-
tional (potentially multilateral) trade deals?
There are two arguments against the thesis that TTIP is a 
defensive trade strategy. 
4 Germany has championed the idea of a transatlantic free trade 
agreement for several years. Under Germany’s EU Presidency in 
2007 it flouted the idea of starting such negotiations – and as part 
of that strategy initialled the Transatlantic Economic Council. 
5  Francois et al (2013).
6 See e.g. Felbermayr & Larch (2013).
7 The Commission recently felt compelled to issue an ”explana-
tory statement” regarding the estimates from the study it 
commissioned, partly to respond to claims that this study had 
underestimated potential gains. See European Commission 
(2013).
3First, neither the EU nor the U.S. is solely focused at their 
transatlantic initiative. They are both pursuing trade agen-
das outside the Atlantic hemisphere. The EU, for instance, 
is negotiating free trade agreements with India, Japan, Ma-
laysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. It is close to fin-
ishing an agreement with Canada and wants to improve it 
bilateral trade accord with Mexico, the first Nafta country it 
signed an FTA with. It has a programme for trade deals in 
Latin America, and has just gone through a process of sign-
ing off a negotiated deal with Andean states. It is negotiat-
ing a trade agreement with Mercosur. That negotiation has 
stalled – but that is not surprising given the overall course 
of trade and economic policy taken by some of the Mercosur 
members. 
Furthermore, the EU is still trying to get countries in Af-
rica to agree to Economic Partnership Agreements that 
would improve on the one-way market access that exists 
through past agreement on preferences. It wants to have 
an agreement with the Gulf countries in the Gulf Coopera-
tion Council. It is now going through a process of getting a 
mandate to negotiate a bilateral investment agreement with 
China – an agreement that also will include a market access 
component. It is hoping to sign an Association Agreement 
with Ukraine and negotiates agreement with the effect of 
opening up trade with Eurasia countries through its East-
ern Partnership. It spearheaded Russia’s entry into the WTO 
and wants to deepen its trade relation with its large Eastern 
neighbour. It is one of the leaders behind the revision of 
the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) and the new 
attempt at negotiating a plurilateral Trade in Services Agree-
ment (TISA).
The list could continue. But the gist of my point should be 
obvious: this is not a trade agenda for an entity that wants to 
build a fortress or shield itself against rising economic pow-
ers. Many of these current initiatives may not lead to results, 
or not to the desired result, but no one should doubt that 
there is a grander strategy guiding the EU which is based on 
liberalising trade with the vast part of the world economy. 
Trade politics in the United States displays greater uneasi-
ness about new trade deals, but redrawn ideological battle 
lines in the U.S. Congress should not conflate the fact that 
the United States is pushing for several new trade deals, 
including TPP and some new plurilateral agreements. The 
U.S. no longer considers itself the hegemon of a global eco-
nomic system and have fewer strategic goals associated with 
the trade policy. Like the European Union, the big shift in 
U.S. trade policy in the recent decade is that it no longer ac-
cepts trade agreements with only a small degree of reciproc-
ity. It now demands trade agreements with two-way trade 
liberalisation, especially those agreements that involve the 
large emerging economies that represent a big part of future 
demand and trade growth.
Second, if you want to lower your exposure to trade with 
some economies, the natural strategy is not to liberalise 
trade with other economies. In today’s world economy, it 
is politically impossible to negotiate trade agreements that 
would seriously hurt other important trade. If TTIP would 
have strongly negative consequences on, say, EU trade with 
Asian countries – if trade diversion would be sizeable – the 
net effect of an agreement would be close to negative. Such 
an agreement would be difficult to get accepted by many ac-
tors that today have vested interests in maintaining current 
relations with those Asian countries.  
Furthermore, in today’s world economy, trade-liberalising 
agreements is not the tool that can be used to generate seri-
ous trade diversion. The effects of bilateral trade agreements 
on the actual geographic structures of trade or commercial 
integration are small because the preferential effects of tar-
iff reductions are mostly negligible and because reforms in 
other trade policies do not generate much diversion. This is 
especially true when two low-tariff economies like the EU 
and the U.S. agree on mutual trade openings. Real trade di-
version tends to be a factor of the size of an initial tariff and 
it therefore follows that the diverting effect of a tariff reduc-
tion from 3 percent to zero will have negligible effects. 
A bilateral trade agreement between two low-tariff econo-
mies will have to be focused at effecting trade-preventing 
measures that previously have not been addressed in trade 
agreements. If such changes can be effected they do not di-
vert existing trade to a significant degree. Moreover, some of 
the changes in market access cannot be done on a reciprocal 
and preferential basis: they will rather apply to other coun-
tries, too. Take for instance the effect of TTIP on Sweden. A 
significant part of the positive effect on GDP of TTIP will ap-
pear in the business services sector (one third of the estimat-
ed gains will be come from the business services sector).8 
This sector has been comparatively closed in Sweden and 
the reforms likely to occur as a consequence of TTIP will 
in most instances apply to other countries, too. Changing 
the rules for commercial presence in, for instance, financial 
services will mostly be done on a multilateral basis.
Let us now turn to the second question: will TTIP help or 
hurt efforts to negotiate international (possibly multilateral) 
trade deals? My view – which is built on my observations 
rather than undisputed facts – is that TTIP is more likely to 
spur than to deter new international trade deals. 
The short motivation for this view is based on politics. The 
most important factor to change the political conditions 
for new international trade agreements is that many larger 
emerging markets become more open to trade liberalisa-
tion, especially countries like China and India. They are now 
far too big, and far too important for actual changes in trade 
flows generated by a trade agreement, to be allowed terms of 
an agreement that would mean little or no liberalisation for 
them. A country like China will feel somewhat uncomfort-
able by an agreement like TTIP. They will fear that they are 
getting side-lined in discussions over the structure of future 
trade agreements. The will feel compelled to accept trade 
agreements that they previously could neglect or even block. 
An example of such a motivation is likely to have been at 
play when China decided to join the TISA negotiations. 
Arguably, this is important for the vitality of the multilateral 
trading system and for the chances to knock new global trade 
liberalisation onto the agenda. In the past 15 years, the multi-
lateral trading system has been a leaderless system with no 
clear direction that has unified the key members. The sys-
tem itself benefited for several decades from the leadership 
8  National Board of Trade (2012).
4Policy Brief 17 · 2013
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 
P.O. Box 8159 Dep, N-0033 Oslo, Norway 
www.nupi.no
Established in 1959, the Norwegian Institute 
of International Affairs [NUPI] is a leading in-
dependent research institute on international 
politics and areas of relevance to Norwegian 
foreign policy. Formally under the Ministry of 
Education and Research, NUPI nevertheless 
operates as an independent, non-political 
instance in all its professional activities. Re-
search undertaken at NUPI ranges from short-
term applied research to more long-term basic 
research.
About the Author
Fredrik Erixon is a Director and co-founder of the Euro-
pean Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE), 
a world-economy think tank based in Brussels, and was 
the Convenor of the Transatlantic Task Force on Trade, a 
joint project of ECIPE and the German Marshall Fund of 
the U.S. that spearheaded the TTIP negotiations.
8
by the United States, which considered this system to be 
critical for its overall strategic objective of spreading market-
based capitalism. There were willing followers to the U.S. 
leadership, but none other than the U.S. had the requisite 
economic, political and institutional capacity to underwrite 
the system. Yet since the collapse of the Cold War, American 
leadership has withered away, and its general position on 
trade liberalisation has somewhat changed. Absent political 
leadership and direction, the Doha Round got stuck because 
the political instinct of many countries was to favour status 
quo rather than new liberalisation as long as there is no ex-
ternal pressure that prompts them to revisit that position. 
Like many other things in economic life, trade liberalisation 
tends to be driven by two motives: profits and fear. Countries 
agree to open up for greater foreign competition because 
they believe it will boost their economy or because they 
fear that other countries will go ahead without them if they 
stubbornly resist liberalisation. Despite all the success of a 
trade-oriented model of growth, many countries have grown 
to think that they will not stand to benefit much from new 
trade liberalisation, or that the political cost of liberalisation 
is too high to stomach. 
TTIP may partly change this. It is a big initiative. And if the 
two biggest economies of the world go for a bilateral agree-
ment, it means that there is a risk for other countries that 
stand outside that bilateral agreement and, which is impor-
tant, other efforts to liberalise trade. That risk is mostly about 
not having a voice in the design of the trade reforms that are 
likely to serve as benchmarks in future international agree-
ments. It is far less about loosing current trade access – but 
it is about the fear of not having as good access to trade that 
will be liberalised in future. Consequently, if TTIP is the ‘real 
thing’, if it achieves the promise of ushering the world into 
21st Century trade policy, the response from the larger emerg-
ing economies cannot be no response at all. The political and 
economic opportunity costs of status quo have changed.
4. Concluding comment
It is impossible to say if TTIP will deliver on its ambitions. 
There are several obstacles that stand in the way of success. 
Some of the obstacles are political: a bipartisan U.S. Con-
gress, a U.S. President with a party divided on trade, politi-
cal bickering by some EU member states, et cetera. Other 
obstacles are about substance – and especially two are criti-
cal. First, the risk that cross-border data portability will be 
seriously curtailed by the EU’s new data protection regula-
tion – and that the EU-U.S. Safe Harbour framework will be 
revoked. This risk has of course been amplified by the recent 
revelations of PRISM and accusations of large-scale U.S. 
government surveillance of European data telecommunica-
tion. Second, that the EU cannot agree to change some of its 
policies derived from the precautionary principle, especially 
its policy on GMOs. Both these issues need to be addressed 
if a deal should be politically feasible. And the current trend 
of policy is one of ever greater distance between the EU and 
the U.S.
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